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Summary 
 
This paper considers the market potential for privately financed long term care products in the 
UK. It finds that since the present market is undeveloped there is scope to increase the range 
of products available to suit people with different means and circumstances. Currently the UK 
spends about £19 billion on long term care (LTC) of which around a third is privately funded 
and two thirds publicly funded. The cost of informal care for older people is estimated to be 
worth £58 billion a year making a total of £77 billion. The paper finds that very few people 
can afford to pay for LTC out of their own pockets from income alone, but that this number is 
increased if savings are taken into account and significantly increased if housing wealth is 
included as well.  
 
Insurance for LTC is normally considered to be part of the product mix usually associated 
with the private funding of LTC. However, as the US market demonstrates, LTC insurance 
products can be complex and difficult to understand and yet still not meet all needs, whilst US 
research suggests that policies are also over priced and unaffordable for many. In this paper 
the case is made for other kinds of products which produce an income at the point of need and 
therefore make a contribution towards LTC costs. These products include equity release, ‘top 
up insurance’, disability linked annuities, and immediate needs annuities. Although they may 
not cover all possible risks, and therefore all needs, they would bring much needed new 
money into LTC as well as lead to an increase in personal responsibility.  
 
With large numbers of older people on very low incomes not everybody would be able to 
afford these products and so the concept of LTC bonds is considered. These would work like 
premium bonds and pay prizes but would only be cashable at the point of need. Taken 
together all of the products considered would extend choice and there would be something to 
meet most circumstances. The government’s role would be five fold: (1) to facilitate the 
introduction of the LTC products and provide regulation; (2) to provide appropriate incentives 
for people to take them up; (3) to clarify the role of the state in terms of the minimum 
entitlement people can expect; (4) to make it easier to get advice and direction at points of 
initial contact, for example with social and health care services; and (5) to cover risks that the 
market cannot handle.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
The UK dependency ratio (the number of retired people per 100 people of working 
age) is projected to increase from 24 today to 40 in 2040. Although substantial, the 
increase is lower than in many other countries. In Japan, for instance, the ratio is 
projected to increase from 30 today to 65 in 2040 (United Nations, 2006)1. Such 
demographic changes are expected to have a significant impact on the demand for 
long term care (LTC). Most consumers of LTC are over age 80; for example, in 
England, almost 80 per cent of care home inhabitants belong to this age group    
(Bajekal, 2002)2. Since increasing life expectancy causes this group to grow at a 
                                                 
1 United Nations, Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2006), 
World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision. 
 
2    Bajekal, M. (2002), Care Homes and their Residents, London: The Stationery Office. 
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faster rate than the general retired population, there is concern that the demographic 
burden could make the current system of financing LTC unsustainable.  
                                                
 
Indeed, in the UK, there is already a trend towards concentrating resources only on 
individuals with severe disability (Karlsson et al, 2006)3.  Currently the UK spends 
around £19 billion a year on long term care of which £13.4 billion (70%) is in 
institutional care and £5.7 billion (30%) in home care. The public sector accounts for 
65% of all expenditure and the private sector 35%. Of private expenditure around 
80% is spent on institutional care and 20% on home care. To these totals should be 
added the value of informal unpaid care by friends and relatives which is estimated to 
be around £58 billion or three times the value of formal care4, so that the total cost of 
LTC is approximately £77 billion a year on this basis. 
 
This paper focuses products and implementation issues relevant in a system that 
would primarily rely on privately financed mechanisms to fund LTC. For present 
purposes LTC is defined as a variety of services that includes medical and non-
medical care to people who have a chronic illness or disability. Most LTC is to assist 
people with support services such as activities of daily living like dressing, bathing, 
and using the toilet. LTC can be provided at home, in the community, in assisted 
living or in nursing homes. and particularly exploit opportunities to bundle different 
significant risks – such as LTC need and longevity. 
 
The paper is concerned to make the products as inclusive as possible in order to 
embrace people and households of all means, even though the amounts they are able 
to afford or contribute will vary considerably after taking into account the distribution 
of wealth and income. Where possible the suggested products are designed to fit with 
the grain of present products on the market such as retirement annuities or equity 
release so as to build on what already exists rather than build a complete system anew. 
The government’s role as a facilitator and regulator is nevertheless important to make 
it work through the tax system and other incentives. 
 
The paper does not address the types of LTC that would be accessible as a result of 
these products since services will be different depending on the level of care need. 
However, in order to motivate discussion we have generally used institutional care 
(i.e. nursing or residential care) in our examples and value different products 
according to the extent they meet this need. The paper focuses on products that would 
satisfy a range of circumstances and income groups at different stages of life.  We 
tend to concentrate on the 65+ age group since this is the age from which major 
personal financial decisions are taken (i.e. at retirement).  
 
The Disability Linked Annuity (DLA), which is one of the products discussed in the 
paper, is designed for people at retirement age itself.  Others help protect against large 
care costs using mechanisms such as insurance or equity release that could be 
 
3 Karlsson M., Mayhew, L., Plumb, R and Rickayzen, B. (2006), "Future costs for long-term care. Cost 
projections for long-term care for older people in the United Kingdom", Health Policy 75, 187-213 
 
4 Figures compiled from Long term care for older people (OECD, 2005), the ONS, and from Karlsson 
et al cited above. 
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purchased at any time or at the point of need. The paper finds that, even with these 
products, large numbers of people would still not be able to afford them. A further 
product, provisionally called the LTC bond, is described which is designed for all 
people but is expected to be especially attractive to low income groups. Together 
these products cover a wide range of needs and circumstances, and are an 
encouragement to save, but they may not be a complete financial solution for 
everybody.  
 
There are several reasons why people might not see funding their own LTC as a 
priority. These include (a) public sector crowding out at point of need; (b) the 
common belief that LTC is free under the National Health Service (NHS); (c) LTC 
insurance products are expensive; (d) spouses and relatives would provide some/all 
care; and (e) LTC is something people prefer not to think about.  A means test sets the 
level of entitlement to free or subsidised care. Determining how many people fall 
above or below this level at the time of need helps to define the potential size of any 
market for privately funded LTC products. This is simple in concept but hard to put 
into practice owing to the complexity in the means testing system.  
 
Recent research has tried to analyse why LTC insurance markets have failed, and has 
identified several characteristics of LTC risk which makes it particularly difficult to 
insure. Apart from the challenge presented by the public sector, the long time 
perspectives create difficulties in insuring against risks such as cost inflation, and 
creates potential for adverse selection taking place. According to US research, LTC 
insurance policies have been insufficient (they cover only a portion of the actual LTC 
risk that an individual faces) and overpriced (premium loadings are much higher than, 
for example, normal health insurance). 
 
It is therefore hardly surprising that the demand for existing LTC insurance products 
has been very low in the UK. However, with the right policies, the Government might 
be able to initiate a market for LTC products of various kinds, not just insurance 
products. Providing the right financial incentives would be one important building 
block in such a policy, but other measures are needed as well. For example, there is a 
potential role for the Government in insuring the risks that the market is unable to 
handle, in regulating the sector so that a small set of standard products emerge with 
which insurance companies can compete for customers, and in making it clear what 
people are entitled to from the state. 
 
It is hypothesised that, with the right mix of policy initiatives and products, it may be 
possible to extend the number of people who could finance LTC from their own 
means. However, because of the lead time require for new products to be introduced 
and fully mature in a market sense, the mix of products is likely to vary according to 
personal circumstances and change over time. Thus, an already retired person living 
from an occupational pension income may have made financial plans that would 
preclude the possibility of purchasing some products that could be attractive to a new 
retiree.  
 
At present with few LTC products on the market, home equity release products will 
be more common in terms of market mix because they deal with immediate needs. By 
contrast, DLAs would be most attractive to new annuitants rather than existing 
pensioners and so take some years to build up, to some extent perhaps displacing 
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equity release in the longer term. ‘Top-up’ insurance could be attractive to wider age 
groups depending on cost and their attractiveness versus other LTC products. LTC 
bonds could also be expected to attract a wider age range of customers including those 
in lower income groups who have only a small occupational pension, and little equity 
of their own. However, LTC bonds would also take time to build up into a worthwhile 
fund and here an analogy is drawn with premium savings bonds. 
 
The paper begins with some broad estimates of the current market for LTC based on 
numbers of people in institutional care. Those that potentially could afford LTC are 
then sub-divided into groups based on income, savings and the wealth contained in 
homes. This analysis is then used to inform a range of products designed around 
individual needs, and specific examples and guideline costs are provided. The take-up 
rate for these products would depend on other factors such as value for money and 
competing demands on people’s resources and this is also discussed. A final section 
discusses some of the incentives that could be applied to encourage take up of LTC 
products including government support. 
 
2. Estimates of the population with LTC care needs according to means 
 
In what follows we refer to a disability scale which ranges from 0 to 10 that derives 
originally from an OPCS survey in the 1980s5 (and discussed in Rickayzen and 
Walsh, 2002).  For our purposes a person who falls into the range 0-6 is assumed to 
be ‘healthy’, between 7 and 8.5 moderately disabled, and between 8.5 and 10 severely 
disabled.  A person in the moderately disabled category is adjudged to have failed 2 
ADLs and in the severely disabled category 3+ ADLs, where ADLs are activities of 
daily living6 7.   
 
To quantify the population that might need LTC, we apply prevalence rates based on 
this scale to the population to obtain estimates of the number of males and females at 
age 65+ with moderate or severe disability. Prevalence measures the stock of disabled 
people at a point in time and so, to obtain a rough idea of the number new cases 
arising annually, we can divide prevalence by the average time spent in LTC. Thus, 
suppose there are 100 disabled people with 3 failed ADLs who spend on average 2 
years in long term care, the number of new cases each year will be 50 on average. The 
examples given in the text which follows are based on LTC durations of 1 to 3 years.   
 
A person with severe disability is more likely to need nursing care than a moderately 
disabled person who could be supported at home. Table 1 shows the estimated 
number of disabled and severely disabled people aged 65+ in the UK in 2008 and 
2020 based on the Rickayzen-Walsh model8 and GAD population projections. It 
indicates an increase overall of around 16% from 1m persons in 2008 to 1.18m in 
2020, the majority of the increase being in the moderately disabled category. The 
                                                 
5 Rickayzen and Walsh (2002) A multi state model of disability for the UK: implications for need for 
long term care for the elderly. British Actuarial Journal, 8, II, 341-392. 
6 Being able to feed, wash and dress oneself, go to the toilet unaided, mobility (e.g. climb stairs) and 
transfer from bed to chair.    
7 Dullaway and Elliot (1998) Long term care Insurance: A guide to Product Design and pricing. Staple 
Inn Actuarial Society. 
8 This table is based on ‘scenario O’ which builds in health improvement over time. With no assumed 
health improvement the volumes would be greater. 
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important point here is that the market is expected to expand not only for institutional 
care but also for people with moderate disabilities. 
 
  Year 2008   Year 2020   
category 
of 
disability 
Male 
(000s) 
Female 
000s 
Total 
(000s 
Male 
(000s 
Female 
(000s 
Total 
(000s 
% 
change 
over 
period 
Moderate 173 323 496 226 358 584 17.7 
Severe 187 333 520 242 352 594 14.2 
Total 360 656 1016 468 710 1178 15.9 
Table 1: The estimated number of disabled and severely disabled people aged 65+ in 
the UK in 2008 and 2020 based on the Rickayzen-Walsh model 
 
The number of residents in institutions and their level of disability is found in the 
Health Survey of England. The HSE’s definition of ‘severe disability’ roughly 
corresponds to Rickayzen-Walsh definitions of ‘moderate and severe’ combined. 
Karlsson et al (2006)9 find that, of the population aged 65+, around 17.1% of females 
and 6% of males categorized as moderately or severely disabled are in nursing homes 
or residential homes on this basis (13.5% on average). The figures in turn imply an 
institutional population of around 127k, 83% of whom are female.  
 
Females form a higher percentage because: (a) on average females are younger than 
male spouses/partners and are commonly care providers for male partners who 
become severely disabled sooner; (b) females spend longer on average in severe 
disability than males; (c) females have a greater propensity to be severely disabled 
than males; and (d) females live longer than males.  
 
North American data suggest that the average 65-year old woman faces a 44 per cent 
risk of ever entering a nursing home, and that she would spend 2 years there on 
average. For males, the corresponding probability is 27 per cent, and the average 
duration is 1.3 years10. For the United Kingdom, the probability that a 65-year old 
woman in full health ever becomes severely disabled – a state in which nursing home 
care is likely to be required – equates to 35 per cent. For males, the corresponding 
probability is 25 per cent. If we define disability more broadly and include moderate 
disability, the probabilities are 51 and 37 per cent, respectively (based on Rickayzen-
Walsh model). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Future costs for long term care – cost projections for long term care for older people in the United 
Kingdom, cited above. 
10 Brown and Finkelstein (2007), “Why Is the Market for Long Term Care Insurance so Small”,  
Journal of Public Economics 91(10): 1967-1991 
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How many can afford LTC? 
 
For analytical purposes the 65+ population and households can be broadly divided 
into four main groups. Those able to finance their own LTC11 from income alone; 
those that can fund LTC from a combination of income and savings; those able to 
fund LTC if they are able to exchange some/all of the equity in their homes; the fourth 
group only have enough resources to make a contribution towards the cost of their 
LTC based on income alone (e.g. the state pension). In cases with insufficient 
resources and no other means of care available, the individual falls back on the state, a 
process that may result in the eventual forced sale of their home if they own one and 
live alone. 
 
Based on income 
 
Very few people or households have the means to pay for LTC using income alone. 
Based on data from the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing12 (ELSA), we 
estimated the total numbers of people aged 65+ and split them into households. Figure 
1 considers couple households with at least one person aged 65+, single adult male 
households 65+, single female adult households 65+, and all households 65+ 
together13.  It shows 3m households have incomes of less than £200 per week, or well 
under half the amount required to fund one week of LTC for one person based on a 
cost of £500 per week.  Figure 1 also implies that fewer than 400k out of 6.5m 
households would have enough income to support one person. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of weekly household incomes by household type (source: 
ELSA) 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 LTC here refers to institutional care. 
12 English Longitudinal Study of Ageing is an interdisciplinary data resource on health, economic 
position and quality of life as people age. Our analysis is based on wave 2, 2004. 
13 Includes residual households e.g. with 2+ adults.  
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Including savings plus income 
 
A larger group of people could be self reliant by drawing on savings until they run 
out. If savings are drawn down regularly in order to top up income then it is possible 
to estimate the duration that different households could pay for LTC for one person in 
different income/savings brackets. This is shown in Figure 2 in which numbers of 
households are plotted against the estimated number of years that one person in a 
household could be self supporting for different household types. The results show 
that approximately 3.5m of the 6.5m households with a person(s) age 65+ would only 
be able to support one person for a year or less, 0.7m for 1 to 2 years, 0.9m for 2 to 3 
years and 1.4m for 3 or more years. A more detailed breakdown by income and 
savings is given in Table 2.  
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Figure 2: Chart showing the number of people that could afford <1, 1-2, 2-3 or 3+ 
years in long term care from a combination of own income and savings (source: 
based on ELSA and other).  
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income (£s 
per week 
gross) 
 (Savings 
£000s)      
<1 1-5 5-10 10-20 20-30 30-50 50+ total 
0-100 51 158 93 62 46 31 48 489 
100-200 282 929 355 308 165 192 253 2,484 
200-300 137 385 200 218 156 159 359 1614 
300-400 37 99 99 125 73 114 264 810 
400-500 40 48 22 60 18 66 201 456 
500-600 18 9 11 16 22 29 148 255 
600+ 15 13 11 18 18 31 288 394 
Total 
households 
(000s) 581 1,639 791 808 498 623 1560 6,500 
Table 2: Number of households (in 000s) with at least one person aged 65+ 
according to weekly income and value of savings (source: ELSA)  
 
Including housing wealth 
 
Most of people’s wealth in the UK today is contained in the value of their homes with 
around 70% of people aged 65+ being home owners.  The managed release of income 
from housing assets is seen as one possible means of paying for LTC. This has several 
advantages over the present system including a chance to pass the property itself on to 
relatives rather than selling it outright. The potential for releasing equity to fund LTC 
is best illustrated by means of Figure 3 which shows the index of house prices as 
compared with an index of care costs from a base value of 100 in 1971.  
 
If one assumes that the cost of LTC has moved broadly in line with the RPI + 1.5% 
and that the weekly cost of care in 2008 was £500 on average, then the equivalent cost 
in 1971 would have been £32 per week by this argument14. By comparison, the 
average price of a house in 1971 was just £6.2k as compared with £230k in 2008 
(based on the FT index of house prices). Thus the ratio of average house prices to the 
annual cost of care was just 3.7 then as compared with 8.8 today (notwithstanding 
recent falls in house prices connected with the credit crunch which will reduce this 
differential in the medium term).    
 
Put differently, the proceeds from selling a house would have paid for roughly 3.7 
years of care in 1971 and 8.8 years of care in 2008 depending on one’s assumptions 
(i.e. administrative charges and interest rates). In practice durations of care are often 
shorter than this (less than a year if a person is severely disabled), so that it would be 
expected that some equity would remain to pass on to relatives after all care costs 
have been met15 . 
                                                 
14 There is no equivalent LTC index stretching back this far. If average earnings are used as a proxy for 
LTC costs then it would show a higher increase than the RPI so we have assumed RPI +1.5%. 
15 Most people entering nursing or residential care are unable to live independently at home and are at 
an advanced stage of frailty.  
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Figure 3: FT house Price Index (source: Acadametrics and ONS) 
 
The 6.5 million households with at least one person aged 65+ equate to a total 
population of 9.9 million. Of these households 2.8m are couple households, 1.0m are 
single male households, 2.4m are single female households and 0.3m are other 
household types (e.g. 2+ adult households). Table 3 based on data from ELSA shows 
the estimated number of households (in 000s) in different income brackets according 
to the net equity remaining in their homes. 
 
income (£s 
per week 
gross) 
Housing 
wealth 
(£000s) 
<1 1-50 
51-
100 
101-
150 
151-
200 
201-
250 
250-
300 300+ total 
0-100 148 22 38 106 70 35 33 37 489 
100-200 971 112 304 348 319 189 104 137 2,484 
200-300 410 57 211 247 282 152 101 154 1614 
300-400 128 22 77 130 137 126 77 112 810 
400-500 57 13 20 46 99 68 55 99 456 
500-600 26 7 18 29 42 29 33 70 255 
600+ 26 9 11 20 24 51 59 194 394 
Total 
households 
(000s) 1,766 242 679 927 973 650 462 802 6,500 
 Table 3: Number of households (in 000s) with at least one person aged 65+ 
according to weekly income and net housing wealth (source: ELSA) 
 
Consider the total resources available to a household if the equity in homes were 
released and combined with income. Note that in couple households, the resources 
must be spread over 2 people and 1 person in a one adult household. Table 4 breaks 
down households by population size and the estimated number of people with 
moderate or severe disability. The final column gives a rough indication of the 
number of new cases with disability per year, so giving a first cut of the number of 
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people in each category potentially flowing on to some form of LTC. It is noteworthy 
that the number, 521k broadly equates to the annual number of deaths in the UK.  
 
Figure 4 breaks down column 1 of Table 4 into constituent household types in which 
it is apparent that households consist essentially of two types for the purpose of 
assessing affordability: home owners or non-home owners. That so many fall into the 
category of being able to support themselves for more than 3 years is because of the 
current high average value of residential property - it could notionally support an 
individual in institutional care for several years. 
   
years of 
affordable 
care 
number of 
households 
(000's) 
number of 
people 
(000's) 
2+ ADLs 
number of 
disabled 
(000's) 
3+ ADLs 
number of 
disabled 
(000's) 
estimated 
number of 
new cases 
of 2+ ADLs 
per year 
<1 1,714 2,619 275 141 137 
1-2 190 291 31 16 15 
2-3 342 523 55 28 27 
> 3 years 4,253 6,496 682 349 341 
total 6,500 9,929 1,042 534 521 
 
Table 4: Number of households and people (000’s)  aged 65+ that could support 
themselves in LTC for given durations from combination of income and equity 
release; the approximate number of disabled (2+ADLs) and severely disabled 
(3+ADLs)  people in each category; and estimated annual flow of new disabled 
persons 65+ with 2+ failed ADLs. 
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Figure 4: Chart showing the number of people that could afford <1, 1-2, 2-3 or 3+ 
years in LTC  from a combination of own income and housing wealth assuming all 
income and wealth can be used to meet LTC need (source: based on ELSA and other). 
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Our findings in the previous sections can be provisionally summarised as follows: 
 
o The probability of needing LTC in later life in the UK is high, but for 
institutional care it is relatively low (about 35% in the case of females); over 
nearly five times as many females as males are in institutional care but they 
are least able to afford it. 
 
o Only around 400k households out of 6.5m age 65+ households can afford 
institutional long term care for more than one year on the basis of income 
alone, but this increases to 3m if savings are included. 
 
o Of the 3.5m households that cannot afford care for more than one year from 
income and savings, 1.6m are female only, 0.6m are male only, and 1.3m are 
couple households.  
 
o If housing wealth is taken into account then 4.8m households could afford care 
for more than 1 year. 
 
o Of the 1.7m households that cannot afford care for more than one year even  if 
housing wealth is included, 0.9m are female only, 0.4m are male only, and 
0.4m are couple households. 
 
 
3. US experience and lessons for the UK 
 
In considering the types of LTC products that could be offered in the UK and their 
design, the United States experience is useful.  In the US, around 10 per cent of the 
older population hold a private LTC insurance policy. The typical purchaser is aged 
around 60 and has substantial assets and income. For example, in the top quartile of 
the wealth distribution, 20 per cent hold an LTC insurance policy, as compared with 
less than 3 per cent in the bottom quartile. Research by Brown and Finkelstein 
(2007)16 shows that there are no big differences in insurance demand between males 
and females, or between married and single individuals (although married individuals 
are slightly over-represented).  
 
Insured individuals are roughly representative of the overall population in terms of 
future needs of disability, a finding which suggests that adverse selection has not been 
a major problem. However, there is evidence to suggest that people are influenced by 
their subsequent experience in the decision whether to keep paying premiums or not 
and so the LTC insurance market has a high proportion of contracts lapsing17. Lapsed 
policies are more common in the first year of purchase and the lapse rate then declines 
to a minimum after about 7 years before increasing again, either because the policy 
becomes unaffordable or it becomes apparent that the benefits will not be needed. 
                                                 
16 Brown and Finkelstein (2007). “Why Is the Market for Long Term Care Insurance so Small?”. 
Journal of Public Economics 91(10): 1967-1991 
 
17 Finkelstein and McGarry (2006), “Multiple dimensions of private information: evidence from the 
long-term care insurance market”.  American Economic Review September 96(4): 938-958/ (since this 
article was published the Society of Actuaries report an easing in lapse rates). 
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Evidence suggests that it is normally healthier people who opt out and thus the stock 
of insured individuals become disproportionately unhealthy over time. 
 
To receive benefits, the insured must meet the policy's disability criteria. Nearly all 
policies define disability as either severe cognitive impairment or the need for help in 
performing at least two ADLs such as bathing and dressing. Typically, policies 
reimburse the insured for LTC expenses up to a fixed amount, such as $100 or $150 
per day either at home or in an institution.  The average annual cost of a policy in 
2005 was around $2k rising to over $2.6k for people aged 75+, including some 
protection against inflation.  
 
In combination with the various limitations (capped daily benefit, time deductible, 
maximum benefit period) typically applying to LTC insurance contracts, the result is 
that insurance benefits tend to cover only a small part of an insured individual’s total 
LTC expenses – as low as 20-30 per cent of total costs in some cases. In some cases 
policy holders pay for benefits they would get from the public sector anyway.  
Overall, the US experience seems to show that products offer poor coverage on 
overpriced terms and that the poor design of the public support system contributes to 
the problem.18  
 
No UK market for LTC insurance currently exists despite various failed attempts to 
launch comparable products.  The lessons for the UK seem to be therefore: (a) seek to 
design the public support system to cover the risks which the private market fails to 
insure (e.g. long spells of disability); (b) encourage competition and transparency in 
the LTC insurance sector; (c) design products that provide cash benefits and ‘top ups’ 
rather than prescribed care packages which can be expensive and over complex, i.e. 
diversify to include products other than traditional insurance; and (d) devise a 
regulatory system so that there are products to suit everybody regardless of income 
and wealth in order that everyone can assume a measure of personal responsibility for 
their long term care needs. The following section approaches the problem from these 
perspectives. 
 
4. Financial products for LTC 
 
The analysis in section 2 put approximate numbers on the UK households that could 
afford LTC in different circumstances based on combinations of income, savings and 
housing wealth. It also shows that a significant number of households could not afford 
LTC regardless of whether housing is taken into account because they do not own a 
home or because the net worth is small. Therefore, a wider range of products is called 
for. The following products are now discussed: (a) equity release; (b) ‘top up’ 
insurance; (c) disability linked annuities; (d) immediate needs annuities and (d) LTC 
bonds. These are designed to cover a range of financial circumstances and needs but 
do not necessarily exhaust the possibilities. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 Brown and Finkelstein (2007). “Why Is the Market for Long Term Care Insurance so Small?”. 
Journal of Public Economics 91(10): 1967-1991 
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(a) Equity release products 
 
Equity release is the mechanism by which individuals release equity held in the value 
of their homes to meet LTC costs. Equity release would normally be used to meet 
immediate needs (i.e. if someone needed to transfer to a nursing home) and did not 
have sufficient income or savings to provide a desired level of care. Much would 
depend on individual circumstances, for example on the person’s income and whether 
they lived alone19.  Although previous analysis showed that considerable numbers of 
households would potentially benefit from equity release to pay for LTC there will be 
some that have already released equity in their homes to support daily living (e.g. 
where a home is seen as a substitute for a pension) and so this could reduce the scope 
for further equity to be released for LTC at a later stage. (According to the industry20 
around 29,000 plans were completed in 2007 valued at around £40k per plan giving a 
total market value of £1.2billion).  
 
There are several types of equity release products. For example, a roll-up mortgage 
allows a person to release a lump sum from the value of their property, with the 
amount released plus any interest accrued repaid from the estate when the person dies. 
In a drawdown lifetime mortgage, cash is released over time, which can reduce the 
amount of interest accrued. In a home reversion plan, some or all of the ownership of 
the property is surrendered in exchange for a lump sum and the right to remain rent 
free in the home for as long as the person lives. Mortgage companies do not like 
homes remaining empty in the event that a sole occupier goes into care; this may limit 
the scope for ownership retention depending on individual circumstances. 
 
The type of product suited to LTC is likely to be for only a short term on the basis of 
immediate needs, which means the pay back period will be short and the consequent 
life time costs low. We consider the following type of equity release scheme based on 
a lump sum which is released in advance of care for a specified number of years. One 
of the main advantages of equity release is that the period of the loan is relatively 
short which means that uncertainties related to cost inflation or trends in disability are 
less likely to disrupt the functioning of these products. On the other hand, the product 
is purchased for immediate needs and hence it offers no insurance of the actual risk of 
becoming disabled, but can only insure risks related to the duration of a disability 
spell. 
 
Example (based on lump sum of £25k, £50k or £75k at the outset) 
 
In the following example a person uses all or part of the equity in a house valued at 
£100k in return for a lump sum to pay for the expected duration of long term care. 
The loan is repayable on death out of the estate. The loan is taken out to pay for the 
care of one adult living at the house. The cost of care is assumed to be £25,000 a year. 
The annual real rate of interest charged is arbitrarily set at 3%. Since we are 
discounting at a real rate of return it is implicitly assumed that care costs rise in line 
with inflation. It is also assumed that there is an administration charge made of 3% of 
                                                 
19 In domiciliary or residential care when a partner stays in the family home property is currently 
disregarded for means testing purposes; thus there would be little incentive for people with low levels 
of liquid assets to release equity from their properties as the law stands. 
20 Source: Safe Homes income plans www.ship-ltd.org 
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the loan required. To keep it simple the loan covers either 1, 2 or 3 years of LTC. 
Table 5 shows the amount of the loan and the equity remaining at the end of care. 
 
Line Time in care 1 year 2 years 3 years 
A money borrowed (£000s) 25 50 75 
B loan to be repaid (£000s) 25.8 53.0 82.0 
C administration cost  of loan 0.75 1.50 2.25 
D equity remaining 100-(B+C)  73.5 45.5 15.8 
E interest charges (B-A) 0.75 3.05 6.95 
F total cost of loan (C+E) 1.5 4.5 9.2 
 Table 5: Lump sum case (assumed cost of care £25k per annum) 
  
(b) Top up insurance 
 
LTC ‘top up’ insurance is a different type of product to equity release and requires 
long term planning on the part of the individual. It is designed to pay the difference in 
cost between a person’s regular income in old age (occupational pension, state 
benefits plus any other regular income) and the anticipated cost of LTC. The product 
does not currently exist in the UK. However, the concept has been analysed in 
Karlsson et al (2006). This product is different from standard LTC products in that it 
is designed to be a contribution to the cost of LTC rather than covering the whole 
amount. This will make the premium lower for those with some means, who would 
not be able to afford the full cost of care from their income or savings alone.  
 
The types of household that could be interested in top insurance are those whose 
weekly income is below the weekly cost of care but not so much that they would need 
to sacrifice other purchases. Such people are assumed to be healthy at the time of 
purchase and may live alone or have no immediate relatives to support them. They 
may have limited housing wealth or be reluctant to take the step of releasing equity in 
their home. The following examples are necessarily indicative and are sensitive to the 
precise assumptions adopted. We have priced them separately for males and females 
and have also considered the unisex rate. 
 
Example 1 (moderate disability, failing 2+ ADLs) 
 
In this example a person buys LTC top up insurance at age 65 that pays out a fixed 
annual amount on becoming disabled to cover the expected gap between income and 
care costs. Assume the premium is paid by the individual so long as they remain 
healthy (i.e. are not on claim). A male or female aged 65 purchases a policy that pays 
out £25k in real terms less their income during each year spent in disability, defined 
as 2+ ADLs failing. We assume that married individuals seek to top up the shortfall of 
half of the total household earnings towards costs of care. The annual premium based 
on this policy is given in Table 6 for a real discount rate of 3 per cent per annum, 
thereby maintaining the value of the benefit over time. It shows that based on failure 
of 2+ ADLs, the annual premium ranges from around £755 p.a. for married couple on 
high incomes to over £3.3k for couples on low income. Corresponding rates are also 
given for single males or females. 
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2+ ADLs Single individuals Married individuals 
Weekly 
income £s male female 
male or 
female male female 
male or 
female 
<100 2,638 3,521 3,079 2,794 3,728 3,261 
100-200 2,025 2,702 2,363 2,487 3,319 2,903 
200-300 1,411 1,883 1,647 2,180 2,910 2,545 
300-400 798 1,065 931 1,874 2,500 2,187 
400-500 184 246 215 1,567 2,091 1,829 
500-600 no need no need no need 1,260 1,682 1,471 
600-700 no need no need no need 953 1,272 1,113 
700-800 no need no need no need 647 863 755 
800+ no need no need no need no need no need no need 
Table 6: Annual premium in £s based on annual care cost of £25k (units £s) 
 
Example 2 (severe disability only, 3+ ADLs) 
 
In this example we use the same assumptions as in Example 1 above, but assume the 
policy only pays out benefits in the case of severe disability (corresponding to 3+ 
ADLs failing) . The estimated premium rates are given in Table 7. As is seen this 
option significantly reduces the cost of the premiums compared with the previous 2+ 
ADL case. 
 
3+ ADLs Single individuals Married individuals 
Weekly 
income £s male female 
male or 
female male female 
male or 
female 
<100 778 898 838 824 951 888 
100-200 597 689 643 734 847 790 
200-300 416 480 448 643 742 693 
300-400 235 272 253 553 638 595 
400-500 54 63 59 462 533 498 
500-600 no need no need no need 372 429 400 
600-700 no need no need no need 281 325 303 
700-800 no need no need no need 191 220 205 
800+ no need no need no need no need no need no need 
Table 7: Annual premium based on annual care cost of £25k (units £s) 
 
 
(c) Disability Linked Annuities (DLAs) 
 
A disability linked annuity is a special type of annuity where the annuity is issued to a 
person who is in reasonable health. However, if the policy holder later becomes 
disabled then the annuity payments are increased to a higher level depending on the 
severity of the disability. An annuity may commence at a rate of £10k p.a., increase to 
£15k p.a. on becoming moderately disabled and to £25k p.a. once the annuitant has 
become severely disabled. In shorthand notation such a policy would normally be 
written as a 1/1.5/2.5 DLA, the factors representing the amount of enhancement or 
uplift to any base annuity. Obviously, the uplift factors can be varied as we show in 
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the examples below. Although DLAs do not currently exist in the UK, their features 
have been analysed in detail by Rickayzen (2007)21. 
 
A DLA has three features that could make it attractive to prospective annuitants: (a) 
reassurance from the fact that the annuitant receives a standard annuity whilst healthy 
and an uplift should they become disabled; (b) the annuity enhancement would help 
with the additional cost of care; (c) the annuity would not prescribe the form that LTC 
might take and therefore might enable a purchaser, for example, to receive care at 
home. With a DLA, the longevity and morbidity risks oppose one another (e.g. the 
higher the morbidity rate, the sooner the individual starts receiving an enhanced 
annuity, but the shorter the overall term as the individual’s health is compromised). 
Bundling the two risks together effectively reduces the variations in expected costs 
across different risk groups, thus making simplified underwriting procedure possible 
and eliminating problems related to asymmetric information between insurers and 
their customers.22  
 
In terms of market share, DLAs would initially be most applicable to people in 
defined contribution pension schemes although the principles could be extended to 
defined benefits schemes.  A limiting factor is that only around 50% of employees are 
in pension schemes if all pension categories are included. Of these, a clear majority 
remain in defined benefit schemes although the number of schemes (and therefore 
membership) is declining over time. The proportion of younger age groups in  pension 
schemes is also reducing. The level of any retirement lump sum would also affect the 
decision on whether to purchase a DLA. If the amount is small, this could limit DLA 
take-up depending on the impact on the base annuity. 
  
Existing annuitants could transfer to a DLA although the terms of transfer would be 
important. The great majority of new annuitants, except those that were already 
disabled or severely disabled at the point of retirement, would qualify. The inclusion 
of protection, for example, against inflation could be made and provision could 
continue to be included for survivors. The scheme could also apply to those in final 
salary schemes which, although in decline, will still account for a significant 
proportion of retirees in the next decade. This would require a change in the scheme 
rules so that the initial pension could be reduced to allow for the disability uplift. 
 
The potential market for DLA products is large and, with over 400k new pensioner 
annuitants each year, DLAs could make an important contribution to LTC planning, 
although the size of the typical pension ‘pot’ is presently a limiting factoring in 
defined contribution schemes23. The public sector, which operates the largest final 
                                                 
21 Rickayzen (2007) An analysis of disability-linked annuities, Actuarial Research Paper no. 180, City 
University, 2007. 
 
22 Murtaugh, C., Spillman, B., and Warshawsky, M. (2001). “In sickness and in health: An annuity 
approach to financing long-term care and retirement income.” The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 
68(2): 225-253. 
23 According to the ABI, almost two-thirds of annuitants arranged their annuity ‘internally’ (through 
the provider of their private pension). Defined contribution pensions are relatively new and therefore 
still maturing, with a majority of schemes only being set up since 2000.  About 41% of annuitants draw 
premiums of less than £10k p.a. and 23% less than £5k p.a. and so are currently small in size (Source: 
ABI  Research  Paper No 8, 2008 ‘Pension Annuities’). However, this is not necessarily a guide going 
forward since many people will own more than one pension pot either through different employers or 
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salary pension scheme of any employer, could take a lead here by introducing them 
first and so extend the principle to defined benefit schemes. According to the ONS the 
total membership of all occupational pension schemes in 2007 was provisionally 
estimated to have been 26.7m. The overall number of active employee members of 
schemes was significantly less at 8.8 m. There were 3.6 million active employee 
members within the private sector, while the public sector accounted for 5.2m 
members.  
 
The above analysis begs the question of whether DLAs could be extended to cover the 
basic state pension. This is now more flexible than before and allows people, for 
example, to defer their pension beyond state pension age and receive a higher pension 
or buy back years to boost entitlement. Within the benefits system disability in the 
65+ age group is dealt with through entitlement to Attendance Allowance, which is 
paid at lower and higher weekly rates of £44.85 and £67, respectively, depending on 
the level of disability. If the weekly value of the state pension is £90.70, this would 
equate to a DLA of 1/1.5/1.7. Further work is needed to understand whether there 
would be administrative advantages or effects on distribution, since tax and other 
benefit rules would be affected by such a change (e.g. if a person goes into a hospital 
or care home).   
 
 Example 1 
A person who is healthy retires at 65 and purchases an annuity with a lump sum at a 
discount rate of 3% p.a. with a base annuity assumed to be £10k per annum. Four 
examples are given in Table 8 using different uplift assumptions on becoming 
moderately disabled and severely disabled.  In the case 1/1.5/2.5 the value of the lump 
sum for a male is £166k and for a female £189k and for a male or female, £178k. This 
compares with the lump sum needed for a constant annuity (1/1/1) of £149k for a 
male and £165k for a female.   
 
Gender 1/1/1 1/1.5/2.5 1/2/2 1/2/3 
male 149 166 164 174 
female 165 189 187 201 
M or F 157 178 176 187 
Table 8: lump sum required to purchase given levels of disability linked annuity 
assuming a base level of £10,000 p.a. (£000s) 
 
Example 2 
An alternative way of looking at DLAs is to consider a person with a lump sum of 
£100k to invest who wishes to consider different DLA options. This may be a more 
realistic case for people who do not know how much they will have until the day of 
retirement. Table 9 shows the levels of annuity that could be purchased under the 
same uplift assumptions as previously. As expected, the greater the uplift for 
disability, the smaller the base annuity.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
individually. Thus the total value of pensions pots per individual can be expected to grow over time as 
they become the preferred means of pension saving. 
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 Uplift Healthy 
Having failed 
2 ADLs 
Having failed 
3+ ADLs 
male 1/1/1 6.73 6.73 6.73 
  1/1.5/2.5 6.03 9.04 15.07 
  1/2/2 6.08 12.17 12.17 
  1/2/3 5.76 11.51 17.27 
female 1/1/1 6.07 6.07 6.07 
  1/1.5/2.5 5.28 7.92 13.20 
  1/2/2 5.34 10.68 10.68 
  1/2/3 4.99 9.97 14.96 
 
Table 9: Level of annual annuity in £000s for males and females based on an initial 
lump sum of £100K with different uplift factors for disability for a person healthy at 
age 65. 
 
(d) Immediate needs annuities 
 
Immediate needs annuities were first introduced in the UK in the late-90s and are 
designed specifically to meet the care costs of those who are at the point of entering 
care, or are already paying for care out of their own resources. Their primary aim is to 
insure against the risk of living too long and hence eliminate the risk of depleting a 
person’s estate by more than they (or their heirs) would wish, or, at an extreme, 
running out of money altogether. They are equally suitable for those paying fees to a 
care home, or paying fees to receive care in their own home.  
 
The typical purchaser of an immediate needs annuity is aged 85, paying a single 
premium of £80,000 to provide payments of approximately £25,000 per annum for the 
rest of their life, increasing either at a predetermined rate or in line with inflation. The 
exact premium payable is calculated with reference to an annuitant’s state of health at 
the time. Taken together, the number of new annuitants each year is small relative to 
the number of people that become severely disabled each year, and of the order of a 
few thousand cases.  
 
Immediate needs annuities are not suited to everybody, although clearly there is a 
good fit with equity release type products and so it is arguable that more could be 
done to promulgate their existence at relevant points of contact e.g. local health or 
social services. Although average life expectancy of a typical purchaser is 
approximately three years, industry data demonstrates that the actual number of years 
lived is highly variable. However, specialist companies offering this product have 
built up sufficient experience to ensure that benefits are paid for life. 
 
There are different variants of immediate needs annuities which can be tailored to 
meet individual circumstances. For example, annuities can be deferred to give the 
client the option to fund the first two or three years’ care fees from their own 
resources with the annuity commencing at the end of the chosen deferment period. 
The single premium payable for this product is commensurately smaller (typically 
£25,000, depending on the deferment period selected). If the policy commences right 
away provision can be included to pay back some of the capital in the event of an 
early death. This is similar to optional guarantees provided for in normal retirement 
annuities. 
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Example 1 
A person in poor health purchases an immediate needs annuity with a lump sum of 
£25k, £50k, £75k or £100k. The person is expected to live 2, 3, 4 or 5 years. Table 10 
shows the level of annuity that could be expected based on a discount rate of 3% per 
annum. Administrative expenses are ignored. So for example if the person were 
expected to live for three years then a lump sum of £75k would buy an annuity of 
£26,000p.a. for as long as the person lived.    
 
                Expected future life (years) 
Lump sum 
(£s) 2 3 4 5 
         25,000  13.1 8.8 6.7 5.5 
         50,000  26.1 17.7 13.5 10.9 
         75,000  39.2 26.5 20.2 16.4 
       100,000  52.3 35.4 26.9 21.8 
Table 10: Example of annual  annuities paid in arrears (£000’s) 
 
Example 2 
‘Immediate needs’ normally implies that the money is needed at the commencement 
of the policy rather than in arrears and can make a sizeable difference to the value of 
the payment. Example 2, Table 11, shows the resultant adjustment in annuity levels in 
this case. 
 
                Expected future life (years) 
Lump sum 
(£s) 2 3 4 5 
         25,000  12.7 8.6 6.5 5.3 
         50,000  25.4 17.2 13.1 10.6 
         75,000  38.1 25.7 19.6 15.9 
       100,000  50.7 34.3 26.1 21.2 
Table 11: Example of annual annuities paid in advance(£000’s) 
 
 
(e) LTC bonds/trust fund 
 
It is obvious from sections 2 and 3 that a significant proportion of the population will 
not be attracted to any of these products especially those on low income, those with 
few assets or only a limited sized pension fund, and those who are already unhealthy. 
It is useful therefore to explore other ways to raise the issue of the cost of LTC and to 
encourage people to put money or assets aside. One idea worthy of consideration is 
the ‘LTC bond’. 
 
LTC bonds are similar to long established premium bonds but would attract interest as 
well as paying out prizes as follows. A person buys regular amount of bonds with a 
face value of say £1 each. A small proportion of the purchase price is deducted and is 
placed in a prize fund. The bonds accumulate in value with interest but are cashable 
only in the event of a person becoming disabled or upon death. LTC bonds would be 
entered into a monthly draw with cash prizes paid out to lucky winners. The product 
could be purchased by anyone over 18 but is expected to be especially attractive to 
older adults on middle to lower income because of the prize element.  
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Any illustration is necessarily highly simplified. Suppose twelve million of the adult 
population buy £100 worth of bonds a year for 25 years from age 50 onwards. Two 
per cent of each bond is deducted and entered into a prize fund which pays out £24m 
p.a. There is a monthly draw with a top prize of £1m and numerous smaller prizes 
(typically over 10,000 prizes a month). A bondholder’s deposit attracts 4% interest 
per annum and the average age of a bond is 13.5 years. The value of a bondholder’s 
assets after 25 years is estimated to be worth £4.1k which combined with pension 
income would be a worthwhile if small contribution towards the cost of LTC. The 
total fund would be worth £19bn in the steady state based on these assumptions and 
even more if enhanced by government top up (see section 5). Administratively, the 
scheme could be run by National Savings & Investments (NS&I) with bonds being 
sold on line or at post offices. 
 
A scheme without a prize element could also be set up which would operate in a 
similar way to the recently established Child Trust Fund. The latter is a long-term 
savings and investment account for children born on or after 1 September 2002. A 
Child Trust Fund voucher for at least £250 is sent to all eligible children after Child 
Benefit has been awarded to them. Children in lower income families that are in 
receipt of a Child Tax Credit with income at or below £14,495 (the current income 
threshold) receive an additional £250 paid directly into their Child Trust Fund 
account. There are further payments of £250 when children turn 7, again with an 
additional £250 for children in families on lower incomes. Anyone can pay money 
into the account, up to the account limit of £1,200 each year, and there is no tax on 
any gains in the account. At 5th April 2007 the value of assets in the Child Trust Fund 
totalled £1.3bn with administration costs of around only £7m p.a. 
 
The size of any market for LTC bonds will depend on how they are structured, the 
incentives to invest and any prize element. A comparison with premium bonds and the 
national lottery is instructive but not necessarily indicative. With premium bonds, the 
top prize is £1m and the total value of prizes is £118m. There are 23.7m premium 
bondholders and the fund is worth about £35billion at the present time (i.e. the 
number of bonds in the draw). This compares with 1957 when bonds were first 
introduced when there were only 6m bondholders. LTC bonds are not the same as the 
lottery because the investment is eventually returned, but as a guideline of what could 
be expected the average UK adult aged over 18 spends just over £100 a year with 
gross ticket sales of £5bn.   
 
 
Summary of potential market for LTC products 
 
The products described fall into three main groups: (1) those that can be purchased at 
any time such as top up insurance or LTC bonds; (2) post retirement products such as 
DLAs purchased close to or at the point of retirement; (3) point of need products such 
as equity release or immediate needs annuities.  Five markets for these products can 
be recognised: 
 
1. People on low income with little or no assets who do not normally consider 
making any provision for LTC (LTC bonds) 
2. People on moderate incomes who may have already committed themselves to a 
standard retirement annuity (top up insurance) 
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3. People who like to plan ahead and have reasonably large pensions (DLAs ) 
4. Those whose wealth is mainly concentrated in their homes and so would need to 
release equity at the point of need (equity release, immediate needs annuities) 
5. People who have sufficient income to self fund. 
 
It is difficult to give a meaningful estimate of the potential demand for the products 
listed above for two reasons. Firstly, an important factor which explains the low 
demand for LTC insurance is the public support system which works as an implicit 
tax on LTC insurance products, thus crowding out a sizeable share of the potential 
demand. Secondly, the public’s understanding of LTC products is low compared with 
the level of complexity, especially so for people in frail health or for their relatives 
who are about to undertake one of the most important financial decisions affecting 
their futures. 
 
We provide below some rough estimates of how such a vibrant market for LTC 
insurance products could be divided into different segments based on income and 
wealth. Figure 5 shows an equity-income map of households that are identifiable as 
households that might be interested in buying LTC products if these products were 
offered. Table 12 quantifies these households and the 65+ population affected, but it 
is not an indication of take-up - only the size of target groups. Note that the products 
overlap so that some households are potentially interested in more than one product 
but would not necessarily buy more than one per person or household. Table 13 
specifies the income and housing equity range assumed for each target group, which 
can be varied in the model.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key: 
 
A
D
B
C
A
D
B
C
Key 
 
A= Equity release 
B= top up insurance 
C= DLA 
D= LTC bond 
Figure 5: Income-equity map of target households for different types of LTC products 
(stylised) 
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product 
all 
households 
65+ (000's) 
couple 
households 
65+ (000's) 
one adult 
male only 
household 
65+ 
(000's) 
one adult 
female 
only 
household 
65+ 
(000's) 
other 
households 
LTC bonds 3,645 1,011 717 1,757 160 
top up 2,423 1,392 283 631 117 
equity release 2,064 959 222 781 102 
DLA 1,520 1,082 150 214 74 
none 394 331 28 16 20 
Table 12:  Estimated number households by type for whom different types of LTC 
product could be attractive 
 
notes: 
Income  
(£s weekly) 
equity 
(£000)   
LTC bonds <300 <200 
top up 200-400 >0 
equity release <400 >150 
DLA 300-600 >0 
self fund >600 >0 
Table 13: Targeting parameters for estimating number of households by product type 
in Table 12 
 
5. Ideas for wider Government financial contribution and incentives to save 
 
The take up of LTC insurance products will depend on number factors, most 
importantly to what extent the government can mitigate the inherent problems in these 
markets. In this section we review the issues and consider potential ways in which the 
Government could support their development and help to bring new money into LTC. 
The hypothesis is that by improving incentives and where necessary any regulations, 
the demand for LTC products would increase among the target groups for different 
types of products and hence market coverage.  However, it is important that any 
policy that seeks to improve the financing of LTC, needs to be guided by the 
problems that have been identified in existing markets such as the US.  
 
As previously mentioned, one reason why the demand for LTC insurance has been so 
low is the effects of the public means testing system. Arguably this is the result of 
policy holders potentially ending up paying twice for services where the benefits are 
in kind (in insurance and through taxes). In theory, this problem could be addressed 
by disregarding private LTC products in the means testing procedure. In other words, 
such a reform would entail turning the system around so that insurance benefits top up 
public provision, instead of vice versa. However, such a reform would have far-
reaching consequences and it might not be possible to implement it in full although it 
is certainly worthy of consideration. Alternatively, measures targeted at solving 
specific problems in the insurance market, or at providing stronger financial 
incentives to purchase insurance, might be preferred.  
 
For example, if the Government were to guarantee to cover all nursing home costs 
above a certain threshold (e.g. £25,000 with a small co-payment on the part of the 
individual), then the chances are much greater that the private insurance market could 
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offer products covering the residual risk. On the other hand, it could be an 
encouragement for nursing home costs to increase. Since many existing LTC 
insurance policies include a limited benefit period, a great deal might be gained 
immediately if the Government were to offer coverage for nursing home spells lasting 
longer than a year or two. The ‘top up’ LTC insurance policies described above could 
also be promoted this way. 
. 
On the issue of  public sector ‘crowding out’, the problem could be alleviated with 
little or no cost to the Government by providing financial incentives to save or invest 
in one or more LTC products. For example, contributions to private and occupational 
pensions already attract tax relief of up to 40% in the case of higher rate taxpayers. 
Since disability linked annuities are arguably an extension of existing pension 
products, they should automatically qualify for tax relief on the same basis (ie tax 
relief on the premiums) but this needs to be verified with the tax authority.  
 
A method which works towards the same end is to create more affordable LTC 
insurance products by subsidising either the consumer or the provider thereby 
enabling lower premiums. This approach would be arguably more effective if the 
consumer is subsidised since it would provide a direct incentive to the individual but 
could be more difficult to administer. Concerning administrative costs, we have seen 
that LTC insurance products tend to be ‘overpriced’ based on US experience, and this 
seems to be related to imperfections on the supply side, as well as the tendency of 
policy holders to lapse their policies after a few years.  
 
The problem might be addressed by regulating administrative costs. A precedent for 
putting a cap on pension administration costs has already been set in the case of some 
UK pension products. However, it is possible that increased transparency and 
competition in the market for LTC insurance products might achieve the same goal, 
without the adverse effects on economic efficiency that price regulations entail. 
Hence, one cost efficient way to increase the efficiency in the insurance market would 
be to define a small number of standard products – such as those suggested in this 
paper – with which the different providers could then compete for customers. 
 
Another alternative would be to provide financial support when a policy is triggered, 
for example simplistically up to £1 for every £1 of pay out subject to a cap (although 
there is no certainty that future governments would honour the deal). Because of the 
long time horizon, purchasers may not be sufficiently incentivised anyway given the 
many uncertainties involved. Equity release products are slightly different since they 
would tend to be purchased at the time of need. In their case it is possible to envisage 
some form of support through, for example, regulation of administrative costs, and 
control over definitions and standards.  
 
Government support and encouragement could also manifest in other ways. For 
example in some countries such as Austria the cost of a care home place is tax 
deductible. In the UK this benefit already applies to the small number with immediate 
needs annuities: provided the annuity is payable to a registered care provider, 
payments made are entirely free of tax. In the general case such tax relief would 
arguably be of more limited advantage since older people have lower pensions than 
on the continent and so pay less income tax anyway. A further downside is that it 
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would not necessarily bring any new money into the system and so its impact is likely 
to be more from a political rather than economic standpoint.  
 
Compulsory LTC insurance has been implemented in Japan and Germany both with 
advanced ageing populations. In the Japanese scheme, launched in 2000, the state 
covers 90% of the cost and the rest is paid from out of pocket payments. There are 
two sources of state funding – LTC insurance, which is paid by people aged 40 years 
and over, and general taxation which shares half the burden. In Germany, compulsory 
LTC insurance was introduced in 1995 with the aim of reducing dependence on social 
assistance. Contributions are based on income are shared between the individual and 
employer (although higher earners can choose to opt out and buy private insurance).  
 
Perhaps the closest analogy in the UK would be if National Insurance were raised but 
with a hypothecated element for LTC. Clearly, the UK Government could introduce 
compulsory LTC insurance as is in Germany and Japan through this mechanism, but 
until now it has not shown any indication of wanting to go down this route. 
Presumably, this is because it would be perceived as a new tax (estimated at between 
1% and 1.3% of income)24. As this paper shows, however, there are lots of solutions 
depending on individual circumstances that involve assets as well as income. With 
housing wealth an important component of any solution for people on low and 
moderate incomes, the idea of compulsory insurance would be difficult to put into 
practice when income in old age is already tight for many. 
 
In the case of LTC bonds or trust funds (effectively bonds without a prize element), 
the Government could add to a person’s LTC fund by topping up personal bond 
accounts, for example on a £1 for £1 basis. This has the advantage of being 
administratively simple and the level of support could be varied over time in the event 
that the fund becomes ‘over-subscribed’. Since this product was designed to target the 
lowest segments of the income distribution, it is likely that any public support going 
into the scheme would simply replace public funds which these individuals would get 
access to anyway through the means testing system. 
  
If the chance of a person needing LTC is, say, 50% then for each pound the 
government added to an individual’s bond holdings, 50 pence on average would be 
used for LTC purposes and 50 pence would go into the person’s estate. According to a 
House of Commons debate in July 2008 the cost of a funeral averages around £2,500 
and the total cost of a death around £6,00025. Currently the Social Fund spends nearly 
£50m a year on funeral grants to around 35,000 people and so, to some extent, 
unspent LTC bonds would have the welcome effect of offsetting this expenditure. 
 
6. Key points 
 
LTC costs are expected to increase significantly over the next 20 years as the 
population ages. These costs include institutional care, home based care and the 
indirect costs of informal care. US experience suggests that insurance products are 
                                                 
24 Long term care financing in four OECD countries: Fiscal burden and distributive effects. Karlsson, 
Mayhew and Rickayzen (2007), Health Policy, 80, 107-134. Japan's Longevity Revolution and the 
Implications for Health Care Finance and Long-term Care. (2001) Mayhew,  IR-01-010, International 
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria.  
25 Hansard Column 1516 July 9th 2008  
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expensive and still do not meet all need. In the UK there is only a small specialised 
market for LTC insurance and big insurers are no longer active in this area. These two 
facts suggest that if a market for LTC products is to grow in the UK it needs to 
diversify into other kinds of products and not simply insurance, although insurance 
will remain a key part of the mix.  
 
In addition it is unrealistic to suppose that people can personally fund all their own 
LTC from income and savings alone in a society in which most household wealth is 
tied up in property. This suggests that a more practical aim should be for people to 
make a worthwhile contribution towards the cost rather than meet every conceivable 
need in order to reduce the public tax burden. It has been shown that the home 
remains a key asset and therefore potential means of funding LTC, but releasing 
equity in the home does not necessarily mean ‘losing the home’.  
 
This paper has described a range of LTC products which would be available to people 
in different circumstances and with different financial means. In all the cases 
considered there are already products on the market on which LTC variants could be 
based and so should not require a large bureaucracy to administer or new government 
machinery to put into place.  Doubtless there will be other ideas for privately financed 
LTC products in the future; however, the institutional environment in which they are 
launched is critical for their potential success as well as the level of transparency.   
 
The paper has not addressed the issue of what, if any, residual public support should 
be available if these products were launched. Since most researchers agree that a 
factor preventing the growth of LTC products is public sector ‘crowding out’, and a 
lack of clarity about what people can expect from the state, the current rules for 
accessing LTC would bear further analysis in order to create a better ‘fit’ between the 
public and private sectors. However, this does not necessarily mean wholesale reform.  
 
Given the complexities of personal finance in later stages of life, one valuable form of 
public support could be greater access to approved financial advisors who would be 
affiliated to local authorities or primary care trusts. Such support could be made 
available within a wider care co-ordination framework that would help direct people 
at their point of need to services in their areas whether provided by the statutory, 
voluntary or private sectors26.  
 
Hence, five roles for the government are suggested for realising the potential for 
privately funded LTC products: These are: (1) to facilitate their introduction and 
provide regulation; (2) to provide appropriate incentives for people to take them up; 
(3) to clarify the role of the state in terms of the minimum entitlement people can 
expect; (4) to make it easier to get advice and direction at points of initial contact, for 
example with social and health care services; and (5) to cover risks that the market 
cannot handle.  
 
 
                                                 
26 The economic and social benefits of care coordination for older people ~The integrated care co-
ordination service (Mayhew L, 2008). See http://networks.csip.org.uk/prevention  Also see ‘On the 
effectiveness of care co-ordination services aimed at preventing hospital admissions and emergency 
attendance’. Health Care Management Science DOI 10.1007/s10729-008-9092-5 
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